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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

THE VETO POWER OF THE JUDICIARY
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
Member of Marquette University Law Faculty

By JUSTicE F. C. ESCHWEILER,

John Jay, who rendered distinguished services in securing the
adoption of the Federal Constitution and as a diplomat in the
perilous and delicate task of negotiating with England the treaty
bearing his name, refused to accept a renewed appointment as
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court because he felt
that court could not obtain the essential energy, weight and dignity
nor acquire the public confidence and respect which it should
possess.'
Alexander Hamilton, the master intellect of the
formative period of this Government in speaking of the judiciary
as one of the branches of govermental power said that it, "is,
beyond comparison, the weakest of the three departments of
power; that it can never attack with success either of the other
two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend
itself against their attacks."12 Montesquieu, the French publicist,
whose then recent work had a profound influence upon those whio
framed our constitution, in dwelling on the English Constitution
of his day and the three sorts of power-legislative, executive and
judiciary-in such a democratic form of government, said, that
3
of such three, "the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing."
By the Federal Constitution-adopted eagerly by some of the
smaller states because of the advantages secured by their equal
representation in the Senate with the states of greater population,
and reluctantly, and by extremely narrow margins by the larger
states, and all influenced by him who outshone them all, George
Washington, the judiciary branch of the Government was given
the breath of life by Article III thereof.
SEcnON i. The judicial power of the United; States shall be vested in
one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. . .
Sn Ou 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equit. arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States,
etc.. . . ...

The Supreme Court as organized by legislation pursuant to
such constitutional direction was anything but a commanding
spectacle during its infancy. Its decisions were reported sandwiched in with those of the Pennsylvania supreme and inferior
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courts in vols. I to 4, DallasReports. It was treated by Congress
with disrespect if not contempt. By legislating as to its terms,
originally fixed for February and August, then in 18ol, to
December and June, and again in 18o2, to February alone, there
occurred an interval of fourteen months after -the appointment of
John Marshall as Chief Justice in which no court could be held
at all.
It is a far cry from such views and treatment of that court
to its tremendous importance and power in later years, when, by
virtue of an implied authority, it exercises in some respects a
greater veto power than that exercised by the President under
the express grant by section 7, Article I, reading:
Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
adjournment), shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the same shall take effect shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and
House of Representatives according to the rules and limitations prescribed
in the case of a bill.

While the veto of the President may be and often is overridden by Congress, yet by the simple declaration of the Supreme
Court in a proceeding wherein neither the legislature which passed
nor the executive who may have added his approval to the law
involved are parties or even heard, that which in such action of
Doe vs. Roe is declared to be no law so far as Doe and Roe alone
are immediately concerned becomes for all practical purposes
void for the rest of the world, though it may remain, and often
so does, in form a law and a part of the statutes. Though
theoretically all others than Doe and Roe, officials to administer it,
as well as parties who might claim rights or defenses thereunder,
might lawfully continue to recognize such statute as the law in
all other instances until each particular instance of claim under
it be challenged in court, yet -in practice when it is once finally
judicially declared to be no law as between John Doe and Richard
Roe it is treated by all others as having been effectively and
permanently vetoed. Its only prospect of revival is by constitutional amendment or change of views indicated by the court in
some subsequent case.
On the other hand, the judicial veto is more limited than that
of the executive in that the letter may exercise his power of
disapproval because he deems the law in excess of the constitu6
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tional power of Congress, or unwise, or inexpedient; the
judicial veto is concerned with the question of power alone.
Whether the legislative wisdom exercised in the adoption of the
particular statute measures up to -thestandard of judicial wisdom,
whether the legislative view of expediency or economics coincides
with the judicial view in such debatable fields theoretically at
least, cannot be, and practically seldom is, the basis for the
exercise by the court of its veto. 4
When the power now exercised by the judiciary enables it to
say to its co-ordinate branch of the Federal Government, Congress; to the people themselves in the exercise of their power to
make or amend the state constitutions, far more effectively than
weary old King Canute to the advancing tide, "Thus far shalt -thou
go and no farther," it cannot be wondered at that many cry out
to know upon what.meat this Caesar hath been fed that he hath
grown so great.
The puny congressional football of A.D. 18oo now effectively
says to its sister in the governmental triad, Congress, that she may
lawfully, in the exercise of -the express power granted her by
section 8, Article I, "to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states," etc., through her administrative
body, the Interstate Commerce Commission, set aside and hold
for naught as unreasonable intrastate railroad rates duly declared
reasonable by similar administrative bodies in the several states ;5
yet says that the same body, Congress, in an attempted exercise
of the identical constitutional provision may not regulate the
subject matter of child labor by legislation as to the interstate
shipments of the products of such labor.6 Again, it tells Congress
that it cannot constitutionally prescribe penalties for excessive
expenditures in primary elections for United States senators,T
although it had just held that a witness before a grand jury could
not question the legality of this identical and void law.8 It speaks,
and the statute of Arizona, regulating judicial procedure in
Arizona, and denying to its own courts the right to issue preliminary injunctions, under certain conditions, in labor disputes
involving the secondary boycott, is wiped off the statute book.9
It says to the state of Ohio, a sovereign in its own sphere, and
containing more inhabitants within its boundaries than were within
the entire United States when the Supreme Court began to function, that it may not embody in its own constitution a provision
permitting the submission by referendum to its own people for
7
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approval or disapproval the action of its own legislature in adopting the eighteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,"
but that under the identical Ohio constitutional referendum
provision the people may vote and reject, if they so will, an act
of the legislature redistricting the state for the purpose of electing representatives to Congress. 1 The people of the state of
Washington are told by the same court, after the exercise by them
of the right granted by -theirown constitution to pass laws by the
initiative, that their law so passed forbidding employment agencies
charging workmen for obtaining positions was a violation of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and
2

therefore void.1

The above are a few of the many illustrations that might be
cited of the wide scope and tremendous effect of the judicial veto.
Such extraordinary power which it has grown to be is not based
upon any express grant. This is so in the Federal Constitution
and so in nearly all of the various state constitutions. Many
reasons for this are evident from the inherent nature and functions of the judicial and executive branches of our Government,
the one to interpret, the other to enforce the law.
This idea of the necessity for an express grant of the executive
veto, and of the judicial veto may rest upon implication, plainly
appears through all of the proceedings in the convention at
Philadelphia in 1787 for the framing of the constitution. The
executive veto was expressly suggested, debated and voted upon. 3
That the judiciary should have the power to declare that not to
be the law which the legislature and executive have declared to be
law was never expressly suggested or voted upon in that convention. In the phraseology employed during the debates as to
the jurisdiction to be conferred on the Supreme Court from the
proposed resolution as to the general form of government to be
considered and presented at the opening of the convention by
Randolph of Virginia, suggesting that such a court be given
jurisdiction, among other things, of, "questions which may involve
the national peace and harmony,"' 4 and again, "to cases arising
under the laws passed by the general legislature and to such
other questions as involve the national peace and harmony,"' 15
or, "to all cases both in law and equity arising under this constitution and the laws of the United States"'" up to the perfected
form of the instrument, not once was it proposed to put in express language into the constitution that which the Supreme Court
8
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subsequently read out of the language used, and to the far-reaching
effect above shown.
Consideration was given at various times during the proceedings of the convention to a proposal to have members of the
Supreme Court act with -the President as a council of revision or
vetoing body on legislation, and in debating such proposal an
independent judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional is
spoken of, notably, as appears from Madison's notes, by Gerry
of Massachusetts, who is quoted as doubting whether the judiciary should be a part of such council, "as they will have a sufficient check against encroachments on their department by their
exposition of the laws which involves a power of deciding on
their constitutionality. In some states the judges had (actually)
set aside laws as being against the constitution. This was done
too with general approbation."'1 And again, from Madison's
notes of a discussion on the same subject on a later day, Colonel
Mason of Virginia said: "They (Supreme Court) could declare
an unconstitutional law void.""'
In the debates on the subject of the jurisdiction to be conferred on the Supreme Court, it was repeatedly mentioned that
such a court would necessarily have such declaratory power as
to unconstitutional laws-by Madison of Virginia,19 by L. Martin
of Maryland,20 by Colonel Mason of Virginia,2 ' by Gouverneur
23
Morris of Pennsylvania,22 by Rufus King of Massachusetts
(subsequently United States Senator from New York), Williamson of North Carolina" and Wilson of Pennsylvania 25 with ap27
parent approval; and by Mercer 28 and Dickinson of Maryland
with strong disapproval.
That such an able and distinguished lawyer member of the convention as Luther Martin clearly so understood such to be the
result of their deliberations is quite evident from his subsequent
report of the proceedings to the Maryland Legislature, wherein
referring to the article conferring jurisdiction, he said, "Whether,
therefore, any laws or regulations of the Congress, or any acts
of its President or other officers are contrary to, or not warranted
by the constitution rests only with the judges, who are appointed
by Congress to determine; by whose determination every state
28
must be bound.1
It is therefore manifest that those who framed the constitution-realized that there was a possible, permissible and reasonable construction proper to be given to the language in Article
9
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III, Federal Constitution, conferring jurisdiction on the courts
under which they might thereafter assert the power here being
considered.
That this particular question, between the time of the Philadelphia convention and the final adoption or ratification of the constitution, did not attract much comment or attention is equally
clear.
9
In No. 78 of the Federaiist,"
written by Alexander Hamilton,
the same articlel in which he suggested a natural weakness in the
judiciary branch of the Government and which is quoted from in
the beginning hereof, he also discusses quite at length and as a
doctrine of importance the power of the courts to declare legislative acts void which are in excess of the powers delegated by
the people through the constitution to the legislative body. He
shows that such doctrine is not based upon the idea of any superiority of the judiciary over the legislative power, but upon
the idea that the power of the people is superior to both. Where
legislative will expressed in statute stands in opposition to the
will of the people expressed in constitution, the judiciary must
regulate its decisions by the fundamental law. He also speaks
of the courts as the bulwarks of a limited constitution, such as
is that of the United States against the legislative encroachments.
30
Hamilton recurred to this subject in No. 81 of the Federalist.
What Hamilton there said on the general subject, and on the
views then and now presented, as to the legislature having the
exclusive right to construe its rights and limitations under the
constitution, has had but little if anything added to it since.
What was subsequently said by Marshall C. J., in the famous case
of Marbury vs. Madison (i Cranch (U. S.) 137, 176), is but a
paraphrase of Hamilton's argument, and the similarity between
the two is striking.
The subject was discussed, so far as the records now show,
not at all in some and but scantily in others of the state conventions, which were held to ratify the constitution. Oliver Ellsworth
said to the Connecticut convention: "If the general legislature
should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial department
is a constitutional check. If the United States go beyond their
powers, if they make a law which the constitution does not
authorize, itis void; and the judicial power, the national judges,
who to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will
declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the states go beyond
10
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their limits, if they make a law which is a usurpation upon the
Federal Government, the law is void; and upright, independent
judges will declare it to be so."'" It was mentioned by John
Marshall in the Virginia convention in which the constitution was
3 2
ratified by a very narrow margin and after a bitter contest.
Therefore at the time the Federal Court began to function it
had a recognized implied power and consequent duty to declare
void any law which was beyond the legislative boundaries fixed
by the constitution or that infringed on individual rights guaranteed by that document.
The power, however, appears to have remained dormant until
declared to be law by Chief Justice John Marshall at the close of
that remarkable case of Marburyvs. Madison (i Cranch (5 U. S.)
137.) These proceedings, though commenced in the December
Term, i8oi, were not argued for a long time, and were decided
February 24, 1803. The plaintiffs had been appointed justices
of the peace for the District of Columbia by President Adams,
and such appointments solemnly confirmed by the United States
Senate. The commissions, however, though apparently made
out, were not delivered during the official lifetime of President
Adams. Upon demand for such commissions they were refused.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had legal right to
their commissions, p. 162; that they were entitled to some form
of proceedings somewhere to get possession, even as against the
Secretary of State, though an agent of the President, pp. 163, i66,
173.
But, then the court held that it, the highest court in the land
could only issue the appropriate writ, mandamus, in the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction or in aid thereof, and not by original
jurisdiction, p. 175-. For that reason relief to the plaintiffs was
denied.
Then, without citation of decision or other authority it was
declared that Congress could not, under the constitution, confer
upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue such writ
of mandamus as Congress had attempted to do in the judiciary
act under which the proceedings had been instituted.
This famous case has been so frequently and elaborately discussed, and especially so lately and so completely by Senator
Beveridge in his life of John Marshall (vol. 3, ch. 3), that it seems
needless here to give it much more attention except to add that
though in form it was a proceeding by Marbury and others,
II
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claiming to have been deprived of the opportunity of holding the
ancient and honorable office of Justice of the Peace against James
Madison, under-study and Secretary of State for Thomas
Jefferson, it was in substance but an episode in that long series
of proceedings which well might have been entitled, Thomas
Jefferson vs. John Marshall, or John Marshall vs. Thomas
Jefferson-which proceedings so often illuminated the early
history of our nation. In -this rather spectacular episode, John
Marshall, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, with colors flying marched boldly up the hill to the very f ront door of President
Jefferson's citadel, and, there halting, trumpeted forth that even
in the Executive Mansion there was no sanctuary against judicial
writs, but, and this little word was quite a shield and a haven
of refuge, but, because the constitution, either through the design
of its framers or by accident, omitted the gift of original jurisdiction for writs of mandamus, the Supreme Court about faced and
gracefully went down the hill again. It thundered, therefore,
far more in the index than in the body.
Possibly it may not here be out of place to call attention to
another case in another court 33 attracting much attention at the

time but now scarcely ever recalled, with the feeling that the
attitude of the court there concerned, its dignity and firmness,
will not suffer in comparison with Marbury vs. Madison.
In November, 1855, Coles Bashford of Oshkosh was a candidate for Governor of Wisconsin against the then incumbent
William A. Barstow; the former received the actual majority of
votes cast, but upon the face of the canvassers' returns the
majority was Barstow's, and he continued to hold office. Original
proceedings were then brought in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin before Whiton C. J. and Smith and Cole, justices. After
a battle royal of the most eminent counsel wherein the fundamentals of our form of government were magnificently discussed,
the court decided that it had and would exercise the power to
determine who was the lawful governor.
Governor Barstow, through his counsel, Carpenter, Arnold and
Orton, withdrew from the proceedings, denying the court's jurisdiction, and his counsel, handed to the court his written defiance,
closed it by saying, "and I shall deem it my imperative duty to
repel, with all the force vested in this department, and infringement upon the rights and powers which I exercise under the
constitution." (P. 735) Undismayed the court proceeded to take
12
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testimony, set aside the canvassers' returns and declared that
Bashford, not Barstow was the legal holder of the office of
Governor, and a judgment of ouster was entered. (p. 8o2) In
spite of Governor Barstow's loud defiance, and of the fact that
he then as de facto and acting governor was under the Wisconsin
Constitution"' the commander-in-chief of the military forces of
the State, nevertheless, without any turmoil or strife, and by
virtue of the mandate of the court, Barstow went out and Bashford went in. That court also marched up the hill but it remained
there.
In writing for the court the decision on one of the points
involved, Justice Cole, subsequently Chief Justice, said: "This
is not only a popular government, but it is a representative government-one where the officers are but the agents, not the rulers,
of the people, one where no man is so high as -to be above the
constitution, and no one so low as to be beneath its protection."

(p. 743)
It may be interesting to note how this idea was later stated by
the United States Supreme Court in United States vs. Lee, io6
U. S.196, 220, "No man in this country is so high that he is above
the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with
impunity. All the officers of the Government, from the highest
to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it."
No decision can be found in Federal or State courts of last
resort where any such courts have declined, on ground of want of
power to do so, to pass upon the question of the alleged invalidity
of a Federal or State law because in excess of the power vested
in any such legislative body by the respective constitutions, and
the highest courts, in substantially all, if not all of the states,
have undertaken jurisdiction and decided such questions.36
This has been done in states, most all of which have constitutions as silent as is that of the United States, so far as any express
language as to such power is concerned. It is, however, expressly
referred to in a few state constitutions.
Georgia, by her constitution of 1877, provides by Article I,
entitled, "Bill of Rights" and by section 4 thereof, "Legislative
Acts in violation of this constitution, or the constitution of the
United States, are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them."' 16
West Virginia, by Article VIII, section 3, of her constitution of
i88o, provides that the Supreme Court of Appeals shall have
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jurisdiction "in cases involving freedom or the constitutionality
37
of the law.1
In Louisiana the constitution as amended in 1913 provides,
Article 85, that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in
"all cases in which the constitutionality or legality of any toll or
impost whatever or of any fine, etc., imposed by a municipal
corporation shall be in contestation . . .. and where a law of
this state has been declared unconstitutional.""8 This last clause
was in the constitution of 1898, and it has been held that under
this decision an appeal does not lie, from a lower court's decision
that a challenged statute is constitutional 9
Virginia's constitution of 19o2, by Article VI, section 88, gives
the Supreme Court of Appeals of five judges, "appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the constitutionality of the law as being
repugnant to the constitution of this state, or of the United States,
or involving the life or liberty of any person; . . . .the assent
of at least three of the judges shall be required for the court to
determine that any law is, or is not, repugnant to the constitution
of this state, or of the United States"; and if in a case involving
the constitutionality of any such law, not more than two of the
judges sitting agree in opinion on the constitutional question
involved, and the case cannot be determined without passing on
such question, no decision shall be rendered therein, but the case
shall be reheard by a full court; and in no case where the jurisdiction of the court depends solely upon the fact that the
constitutionality of the law is involved, shall the court decide the
case upon its merits, unless the contention of the appellant upon
the constitutional question be sustained." 40
Ohio's Constitutions of 18o2 and 1851 were silent on the
subject. 41 By an amendment in 1883 -to Article IV, section 2,
it was provided that "whenever a case shall involve the constitutionality of an act of the general assembly or of an act of
Congress, it shall be reserved to the whole court for adjudica43
tion," 2 although such power had been exercised continually.
By amendment in 1913 the number of justices was made seven
and there were added clauses giving it, "appellate jurisdiction in
all cases involving questions arising under the constitution of Ihe
United States or of this state," also, "No law shall be held
unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the
affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals (an intermediate
14
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appellate court), declaring a law unconstitutional and void," and
also, of significance on another view hereinafter discussed, "no
law shall be passed or rule made whereby any person shall be
prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme
court."

44

Colorado's original constitution of 1876 was also silent on this
point. By amendment in 1904 to Article VI, section 3, it provided
that "no case involving a construction of the constitution of this
state, or of the United States, shall be decided except by the
court en banc (provision having been made for the court of seven
judges to sit in two or more departments). 4 In 191o, by
amendment to Article V, "Legislative Department," the people
reserved to themselves -the right to legislate by the initiative and
referendum, 46 and then in 1913, by amendment to the Article on
the judiciary, provided that "None of said courts except the
Supreme Court shall have any power to declare or adjudicate any
law of this state, or any city charter, or an amendment thereto
adopted by the people in cities acting under Article XX hereof,
as in violation of the constitution of this state or of the United
States"; then follows a provision permitting a referendum on
such decisions holding a law unconstitutional.
Minnesota, in 1913, submitted to the people a proposed
constitutional amendment increasing the members of the supreme
court from four to six and providing: "but no statute shall be
declared unconstitutional unless five members of the court shall
concur in the decision." 48 This was defeated, however, by the
people.
North Dakota, in 1918, adopted an amendment prohibiting the
court from declaring a law unconstitutional if more than one
49

judge dissented.

New York amended its constitution in 1894, but then as before
made no reference to this subject. It held in 1915 a convention
again to amend or revise the constitution, but, though a resolution
appears to have been presented suggesting a change as to the
numbers of justices requisite before declaring a law void, 0 yet it
does not appear to have received attention by the convention and
was not included in the draft reported by its judiciary committee,
Mr. Wickersham, chairman, and was not included in the form of
the constitution submitted to and rejected by the people.
Illinois revised its constitution in 187o, and was silent on this
subject. A convention has been. at work in that state since 192o,
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and has drafted a form which is to be submitted to the people in
December, 1922. A suggestion was made in that convention that
the new instrument should require an extraordinary majority in
decisions involving the constitutionality of statutes. Such provision, however, was not adopted and the form of constitution
being now submitted provides, in section 87, for a supreme court
of seven members, its present number, and requires by section 91,
a concurrence of four members for every decision, and by section
93, confers original jurisdiction on that court, among other things
in "cases involving questions of great public importance" and
appellate jurisdiction in all cases, but makes no specific reference
to the kind of decisions here considered.
Massachusetts held such a constitutional convention in 1917 and
1918, pursuant to a popular vote in 1916 of almost two to one,
with 32o delegates elected by the people. 51 Its then constitution
was that of 178o as amended. It contained no provision on our
subject, and indeed expressly provided, with a corresponding
provision as to the executive and legislature, that "The Judicial
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either
of them: to the end that it may be a government of laws and not
of men," Part the First. Article XXX.52 It contained no express
grant of judicial power and provided tenure of judicial offices
during good behavior.53 Not to exceed fifty-nine instances
between 18O4 and 1916 were found in which the court set aside
statutes as unconstitutional."
There were submitted several proposed changes on the question
here considered: viz., in substance, That the supreme court
should not hold an act void because unconstitutional, without the
concurrence of at least all but one of the justices; or not without
concurrence of not less than two-thirds; or not if one justice
shall hold or express an opinion that it is constitutional; or, that
no court should assume or exercise such power.55 They were
debated at great length and for several days, and each and all
rejected by the Committee of the whole and by the convention
itself.5 6 The result of this convention's work was approved by
-thepeople in November, I919,57 with no change as to the judiciary
power, and expressly providing as to the initiative petition and
proceeding then newly provided, that no such initiative should be
permitted that related "to the appointment, qualification, tenure,
removal, recall or compensation of judges; or to the reversal of a
judicial decision."'z
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Pennsylvania also had such a constitutional convention in
i919-2o,

and I canot find from the report of its proceedings -that

such question was presented, at any rate it is not embodied in the
completed draft as indicated in the statement as to the proposed
changes"' as the result of the convention.
In constitutional conventions held in Alabama in I9OI, Connecticut in 19o2, New Hampshire in 1912, Louisiana in 1913 and
Nebraska in 1919, no suggestion appears even to have been
presented looking to the curtailment or taking away of this
universally recognized power in the courts to veto unconstitutional
legislation. Some suggestion was made in that regard in the
Ohio Constitution of 1912, but rejected by the committee and the
convention without debate even in the latter. The convention in
Virginia in 19Ol discussed the provision in the constitution of
that state which has been quoted above, but did not suggest the
taking away of such power.
The Wisconsin constitution is also silent in this regard. The
judicial power is declared to be vested in the supreme court,
circuit courts and others by section 2, Article VII, and the
supreme court's jurisdiction is defined in section 3. The power
so granted has been often construed and held to furnish ample
scope to permit the court to restrain officials and others from
executing or relying upon laws which are beyond legislative
authority. The much broader scope of the original jurisdiction
of the state supreme court over that conferred on the United
States Supreme Court was pointed out in a very fine discussion
of the subject in a very early case.60 The doctrine of the judicial
61
veto is firmly established in this state.
Though the challenges of this power asserted by the courts have
been continuous since Marbury vs. Madison, yet so far as the
expressions of public will are concerned the power has been permitted to grow rather -than curtailed.
The fearless "Old Hickory" in his message of July io, 1832,
returning to the Senate without his approval the act incorporating
the Bank of the United States, said: "The Congress, the
Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its
own opinion of the ConstitutiQn. Each public officer who takes
an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support
it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It
is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the
Senate, and the President to decide upon the constitutionality of
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any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage
or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought
before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has
no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has
over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of
both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore,
be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting
in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as
the force of their reasoning may deserve. 8'

2

Yet even this King

Canute could not stay the tide.
The somewhat impetuous President Roosevelt also devoted
considerable energy to this subject in 1910-12. Taking as his
first text, his disappointment, to use the mildest designation, at
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the Knight
Sugar Trust and Bakeshop cases, 63 he vigorously discussed the
subject of possible control of judicial control over legislation in a
speech before the Colorado Legislature and state officials, August
29, 19io, and devoted several articles to this subject in The Outlook of which he was a contributing editor.6 4 He scathingly
criticized the American Bar Association 65 for its attitude on the
referendum, and under the caption "Do You Believe in the Rule
of The People?" he advocated the referendum as to judicial
decisions. 66 Yet The Outlook agreed in its issue of even date with
President Taft's view expressed in his veto in August, 1911, of
the bill admitting Arizona and NewMexico to statehood, because
of the objectional provision in the Arizona constitution for the
recall of judges.67 Arizona, however, in I912 immediately after
admission to Statehood, amended its constitution so as to permit
the recall of judicial officers. 68 Apparently but one state, Colorado, adopted President Roosevelt's idea and that state did in 1912,
by constitutional amendment, provide for referendum as to
judicial decisions, 69 which is, however, in effect, but a short
method of constitutional amendment; and as we have seen above,
Massachusetts in 1921 expressly rejected the idea. It should be
noted in this connection that Colorado had already in 191o
provided for the referendum as to legislative action.
While it is true that there is often sincerely felt and forcibly
expressed a distrust and fear of this power of the judiciary, yet
it must not be overlooked that there has been always an equally
or at least a strong distrust and fear of possible abuse of legislative
power. Both such views are natural in a form of government
18

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

such as ours, based upon the fundamental idea of checks and
balances of one branch upon the others or of the people on all
three, and upon the still more fundamental idea, which distinguishes this from that of many of the European and Oriental
forms or theories of government: viz., that with us governments
exist for the good of the people, in the others the people exist for
the good of the governing power; here the State is but the
instrument to protect and preserve the rights of the people, there
the people are but the instrument to protect and preserve the State.
Arbitrary power, says Edmund Burke, in the trial of Warren
Hastings is unsafe in any man's hands. To guard against such
unsafe power written constitutions have been instituted, feeble it
is true at times, 'but still, seemingly, the best safeguard in that
respect that human ingenuity has been able to devise, according
at least to the ideas embodied in American Government.
It is a common and apparently inalienable or at least inseparable
attribute of human nature that the having of power by one over
others pretty surely breeds lust for more power, with an accompanying jealousy of the power resting in or exercised by
some one else. The legislator naturally views with alarm the
possible encroachment in his chosen field by executive or judiciary,
they in turn reciprocate and each, assured of his own rectitude,
unconsciously, perhaps, shares in the desire so naively expressed
by "Old Hickory" in his veto measure quoted above, to have the
last say. It would perhaps be not surprising to find that the
people at large possess what resembles a conglomeration of the
respective jealousies of the respectable three above named. The
idea is sometimes expressed or suggested that in some way the
legislative branch of our Government is more exclusively, or more
nearly, the mouthpiece of the will of the people than any other
governmental institution and that therefore its voice is entitled
to be heard above all others; but that such doctrine is often heard
does not necessarily demonstrate that it is well founded.
If there be just cause for fear of abuse and distrust of the
use of judicial power, and I must regretfully admit that there
sometimes may be, yet there always has been, and still is, increasingly, a distrust and fear of unbridled legislative power.
One of the great stumbling blocks in the way of the adoption
of the Federal Constitution was this very thing, namely, fear that
the legislative hands had not been sufficiently tied, and it was met
by the immediate adoption of the first ten amendments to -that
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constitution, and particularly the first eight, the so-called Bill of
Rights, echoes, some of them, of Magna Charta, and intended
to secure the individual against arbitrary power, that might, it
was feared, and with substantial ground for such fear, be exercised
by the legislative branch of the government. While these first
ten federal amendments are not effective as to the individual
states70 their counterparts are found in practically all if not all
of the state constitutions and generally with many more restraints
such as relate to special legislation, debt limits, use of the state
credit, etc., all of which are manacles on the legislative arm.
Freedom of speech, freedom to worship, to petition, to be secure
from unlawful search, to obtain justice without delay, to demand
compensation for property taken for public purpose, from bill of
attainder, ex post facto law or laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, from corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate upon
conviction, would each seem a fundamental right to which no
danger could ever be anticipated; it would seem unlikely that the
legislature of a free people would need to be solemnly and
specifically enjoined from any infringement of such elementary
rights. Yet such reliance upon legislative self-control as would
be indicated by a failure to insert such restrictions in our written
constitutions is not yet found.
The causes that led this country to separate from England
were largely of legislative origin. The Stamp Tax and the Tea
Tax were creations of Parliament. It was taxation by Parliament
without representation in Parliament that was the ground for
bitter complaint. When the discord between the colonies
and Great Britain finally culminated in the Declaration of
Independence-after the signing of which by the representatives
of the various colonies they must, as one of them grimly said,
"All hang together or they would all hang separately," they
clearly indicated in that immortal instrument their great distrust
of legislative authority. After enunciating their list of grievous
charges against King George III, most of which, by the way,
were made possible by legislation, they, through their scrivener
Thomas Jefferson, added this, as their sober reflection upon a
system of Government which had no written boundaries to
legislative action:
"Nor have we been wanting in attention to our British brethren.
We have warned them from time to time of attempts, by their
legislature,to extend on unwarrantablejurisdictionover us. We
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have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and
settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and
magnanimity; and we have conjured them, by the ties of our
common kindred, to disavow these usurpations, which would
inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They
too, have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity.
We must therefore acquiesce in the necessity which denounces
our separation, and hold them as we hold the rest of mankind,
enemies in war, in peace friends."
Starting with such views it is not to be wondered at that the
founders of this Government for the people feared to place
unlimited power anywhere, and even tied themselves by written
constitutions with labored methods of amendment thereof. They
evidently realized that any newly arising breeze of popular feeling
might be but a passing whim and not a substantial change of
public policy. The one uncontrollable legislative power recognized
in our Federal and State constitutions: viz., that each branch
of the legislature shall be judge of the qualifications of its
members, or as defined in the Wisconsin Constitution, power to
expel its members, has never been questioned by the courts or any
other branch of the Government. Yet the exercise of that power
by the refusal of the New York Assembly in April, and again
in September, 1920, to permit five members of a minority party
returned as elected to that body to be seated as such caused great
comment and was vigorously opposed at the lengthy hearing
had before the assembly judiciary committee by leading representatives of the bar, among others Charles E. Hughes and
Judge O'Brien, which but illustrates the feelings against unbridled
power.
In the Philadelphia convention of 1787 much debate was had
on the proposal to create a Council of Revision consisting of the
President and members of the Supreme Court to pass on all
legislative enactments before they could become laws, and, as
mentioned above,7 1 though such method was not adopted for the
Federal Government, it was by at least one of the states. Illinois
had such a council of the governor and the judges of the Supreme
Court to revise all legislation in its original constitution of 1818,
so remaining until 1848.7 Several constitutions provided for
councils of State to advise with the governor though seemingly
with no revisionary or veto power over legislation-Maryland,"3
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North Carolina," and Virginia in I776,7 5 Maine in 1819,76 and
Virginia in 1793. 77

A somewhat similar revising effect or check on unconstitutional
acts by the legislature is reached by the governments in the
constitutions of several states which contain provisions that the
judges of the highest state court may be called upon to give their
opinions in advance as to such proposed legislation. It is provided
for in Massachusetts in Part II, Chapter 3-2 ;7S Maine, Article
VI, section 3 ;79New Hampshire, Part II, Article 73 ;soFlorida,
by the governor only, Article IV, section 13 ;s1South Dakota, the
same, by Article V, section 13, in 1889.'2 Rhode Island, as late as
19o2, by amendment, Article XII, section 2,63 placed such duty
on the supreme court at the request of the governor or the
legislature. Colorado in 1886, by amendment to Article VI,
section 3," provided such opinion should be furnished "upon
important questions upon solemn occasions when required by the
governor, the senate, or the house of representatives."
The primary idea of the duties of a governor of a state is that
of the executive, he who executes or carries out the will of the
legislature. The idea of his having a voice in the making of the
legislation which he is to enforce is somewhat incongruous and
a mixture of the two functions. It is, of course, an adjunct to
rather than an inherent part of the executive function. Yet such
a brake is the executive disapproval, requiring a larger vote to
override than to pass the measures originally, is a part of the
Federal Constitution and of that of every state in the Union
except North Carolina, whose constitution of 1876 contains no
provision requiring the approval or signature of the governor to
legislation,88 and none such is found in its constitution of 18o8
or those prior thereto. Rhode Island, the state which did not
participate in the Philadelphia convention in 1787, which was
the last of the original thirteen colonies to approve of and ratify
the Constitution, and the last to adopt a new constitution, remaining under charter from Charles II in 1663 until 1842, by her
constitution then adopted gave the governor no veto power, but
by amendment as late as 19o9 to Article XV, she did expressly
vest him with such power."8
There has, therefore, been a constantly increasing rather than
decreasing tendency in giving the executive a control over the
legislative branch of government. In no instance has it been
taken away where it once existed.
22
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The initiative and referendum methods of popular or direct
legislation of comparatively recent years, apparently starting in
South Dakota in 1898, and Utah in igoo, are now found in one
form or another in -the constitutions of at least the following
eighteen states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah
and Washington; though not as yet in force in Idaho, and not
in Utah until 1917 (by Ch.5) of that year for want of appropriate
legislation. The extreme length to which Ohio went in her check
on legislation even as to the amendments to the Federal Constitution held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court,
and some of the details as to the proposed Massachusetts amendments, have been commented on above.
All such measures are express reservations by the people to
themselves of powers that otherwise belong to the legislative
branch, they are born from distrust of or dissatisfaction with
legislative action. The initiative is the popular medicine applied
when the legislature is torpid or sluggish, the referendum when
the legislative action is too hasty or fractious. The increased
demand for -these measures would seem to be an emphatic denial
that there is too much curb or control over the legislature.
Occasional comparisons are made of our' system of judicial
review or veto with the English system, where, it is said, no court
dares to declare an act of Parliament void. Manifestly the
comparison is of no avail. The English are willing to rest their
rights as they do, in the rulings of Parliament, a body subject to
recall, not at any stated period, but at any moment the Ministers
of the Crown are outvoted in any measure they propose, by the
members of Parliament, in response to what such members
believe is the wish of the people whom they represent.
Having established no standard, wherewith could the English
courts take measure? The substantial difference between the two
ideas is well evidenced in the form of the official oaths required
in the two countries. Here it is to support and maintain the
constitution ;-and see what the court said in United States vs.
Lee, io6 U. S., at p. 22o. There such judicial officers, and others
that are required to take oath prior to assuming duties, say, just
as do members of Parliament, the law-making body; "I . ...
(name) . . . .do swear that I will be faithful and bear true
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allegiance to ..........
(the reigning sovereign) his heirs and
successors, according to law. So help me God." 7
One of the reasons why the founders of this nation separated
from England was because they did not like a form of government where legislative license was unbridled and unhampered.
and they elected to build foundations for this nation's greatness
and that of her states upon written constitutions filled with
checks and balances and restrictions upon legislative power. Such
written covenants by the people, with the people, for the people,
are the law of this land as distinguished from the laws of
Parliament which form the law of that land.
The very nature of a written constitution is such that to its
language as applicable to any given situation there can be but one
Interpretation which can be the correct one and it does not permit
of a diversity as to its right construction and real meaning,
however diverse views may be. If there be three opposing views
as to the construction of the language of a constitution it is possible
that the three may be wrong but it is absolute that two must be
wrong. Somewhere, of necessity, there must be a power to
declare, subject of course to the inherent weakness of human
instruments to err, what is the one right construction of such an
instrument. That the constitutional declaration may be antiquated
and unfit for present modem conditions is a ground for amendment thereof rather than for disregard or false constructions. It
cannot rest in two or more places or bodies to pronounce an ultimate result.
To adopt the theory of President Jackson as expressed in his
veto message quoted above, that there may be as many permissible interpretations of a constitution as there are possible interpreters, recalls to mind the memorable encounter between Sir
Hugh and Sir Oliver in the days of chivalry. They discussed,
upon breaking their noonday bread by the sparkling spring, the
shield that had hung at the four comers which they had just
passed. "Foresooth," said Sir Hugh, "it was a goodly shield
and silver bright." "Nay," said Sir Oliver, "it was indeed a
goodly shield, but of yellow gold." Then followed the necessary
challenge to mortal combat and after gentle joust in which Sir
Hugh was killed and Sir Oliver disabled, a post mortem examination disclosed that the shield was silver on the side from
which Sir Hugh approached and of beaten gold from Sir Oliver's.
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A constitution on the contrary must read the same however

viewed.
Apparently recognizing the wisdom of that which has been for
centuries a judicial axiom, that no man can be judge in his own
cause, the people of this nation have indicated by acquiescence
and, by express declarations that power shall rest with the courts
rather than with the body which enacts the law and views it
with all the natural pride of authorship. It has been suggested
that it is just such pride of authorship which makes motions for
rehearings in appellate courts so generally unabating,
What the compass is to the sailor on the sea, such is the constitution to those who have a part in the sailing of the ship of
state over the troubled waters that surround all human enterprises. If captain and mate insist on following their different
readings of the same compass the ship goes on the rocks. It is
firmly fixed now, as the law of this land, that the courts are the
final arbiters in disputes arising from or under enactments by
another branch of the Government, the legislature, and though
the duty is often an unpleasant one yet it is one that the constitution requires as much as though expressly so set forth.
That such duty may involve a seeming disregard or disrespect
of another branch of the Government adds -to the difficulty but
does not lessen the obligation. The strong and the majority
generally can take care of themselves; the weak and the minority
need the protection of the written guarantees, which the genius
of the fathers and founders of this Government have accorded
them, and which it is the duty of those sworn to uphold and support the constitutions, state and Federal, to defend and maintain.
The individual, however humble, oppressed by a law which
the law-making body has no constitutional warrant for making,
is entitled to as much solicitude, care and protection by the
courts, indeed to greater care and solicitude, because the odds
are greater than when he complains of the unlawful acts of an
individual neighbor. Thus may, and may only, and must be,
secured and preserved those guaranteed inherent rights of the
individual for whose security and preservation our Government is
instituted and stands solemnly pledged.8
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